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1 
 
In June 2003, the Supreme Court declared high-tech censorship 
constitutional.  
 
2 
 
Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act, or CIPA, in 
1999.  The law requires all publicly funded libraries to 
electronically regulate the access of patrons to the World Wide 
Web.  The “filtering software” is far from perfect.  It partly fails in 
its primary aim:  shielding underage eyes from pornography.  
Worse, the software censors massive quantities of legitimate 
information from children and adults alike. 
 
 
3 
 
The Supreme Court’s 6-3 vote in United States v. American 
Library Association obscures an ominous detail.  Only four 
justices bothered to acknowledge that censoring public access to 
cyberspace is a First Amendment issue.  Four justices outright 
denied it.  They called the legislation a mere matter of purse 
strings, declaring that Congress can dictate rules to institutions 
that take federal funds.  The Court’s ninth justice, Kennedy, made 
vague noises of sympathy for “constitutionally protected Internet 
material” but voted to uphold the law.  As Kennedy loitered on the 
fence, the First Amendment slipped through its pickets. 
 
 
4 
 
There are five things wrong with the US v. ALA decision.  The 
purse-strings argument is almost as faulty as the filtering 
technology; and the Court misconceives censorship, federalism, 
and what libraries are for.  As a scholar of law and politics, but 
especially as a former librarian, I criticize from experience.  
Perhaps these credentials add weight to the arguments to come.  
The wonder of the Web, though, is that I don’t have to have such 
credentials to be heard.  Were this article not printed in a journal, I 
could post it online myself.  The question after US v. ALA is:  who 
will be able to read it? 
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Webs of Information and 
Tangles of Purse Strings  
 
5 
 
How could Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas argue that 
the First Amendment has no bearing on the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act?  The Justices focused instead on the “spending 
clause” of the Constitution (Article 1, §8).  Congress gets great 
leeway in attaching conditions to funding.  Thus the Chief Justice 
dismissed the American Library Association’s concerns about 
censorship with a wave of his hand:  “To the extent that libraries 
wish to offer unfiltered access,” he wrote, “they are free to do so 
without federal assistance.” 
 
 
6 
 
The claim sounds straightforward.  If Congress foots the bill, 
Congress calls the shots.  Upon closer inspection, though, the 
picture complicates.  Several pieces of legislation fund American 
public libraries.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established 
the “E-Rate” program, which enables libraries to purchase Internet 
access at reduced rates.  The Library Services and Technology Act 
of 1996 funds technologies to share information among libraries 
and other community services.  It also fosters programs to make 
library resources more accessible to urban, rural, and low-income 
citizens.  These laws, taken with the Court’s latest ruling, suggest 
that the government might rightly regulate any detail of library 
operations.  Is this what we want?  Schools are an obvious 
example, akin to libraries in their provisions of information to the 
public.  Do we take this tangle of federal purse strings to mean that 
President Bush can tell us what to teach?  Could he, a conservative 
Christian, order us to learn creationism instead of evolutionary 
theory?  Of course not.  Courts have repeatedly struck down 
similar curricular requirements set by state laws.  Federal funding 
cannot require rules in conflict with our basic freedoms. 
 
 
7 
 
Even if we accept that money comes with strings attached, 
sweeping censorship remains inappropriate.  The Children’s 
Internet Protection Act stretches regulation far beyond the scope 
of its funding.  “The Government does not merely seek to control a 
library’s discretion with respect to computers purchased with 
Government funds or those computers with Government-
discounted Internet access,” noted Justice Stevens.  “CIPA requires 
libraries to install filtering software on every computer with 
Internet access if the library receives any discount from the E-Rate 
program or any funds from the LSTA program.” 
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8 
 
The bottom line is that rights are worthless without means to 
exercise them.  When Rehnquist declared libraries free to offer 
Internet access without federal assistance, he ignored the reality 
that every public library relies on public funding to function.  
Spring 2003 provided a poignant illustration:  The nation’s first 
public library, founded by Ben Franklin, nearly closed its doors.  
Our economic recession has forced steep budget cuts at the state 
level, and libraries have been frontline casualties.  The Franklin 
Public Library remains open today thanks to an $18,000 federal 
grant.  When the Chief Justice contrasted outright penalties and a 
(mere) lack of subsidies, Stevens correctly called the distinction 
immaterial:  “An abridgment of speech by means of a threatened 
denial of benefits can be just as pernicious as an abridgment by 
means of a threatened penalty.” 
 
 
9 
 
Rehnquist acknowledged ― yet managed to ignore ― the 
precedent of Board of Commissioners, Wabaunsee County v. 
Umbehr (1996), where the Court opined that “the government 
‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ even if he has no 
entitlement to that benefit.”  As the Court affirmed the capacity of 
Congress to attach conditions to the receipt of aid in South Dakota 
v. Dole (1987), it nevertheless stipulated that Congress could not 
compel the recipient “to engage in activities that would themselves 
be unconstitutional.”  Try as they might, Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
Scalia, and Thomas could not entirely escape the clutches of the 
Constitution through the trapdoor of the “spending clause.”  The 
First Amendment demanded attention. 
 
 
 
 
A Tradition of Libraries 
as Social Forums  
 
10 
 
Forced to address the First Amendment, Rehnquist asserted that 
libraries are for listening, not speaking.  Thus library restrictions 
would not fall within the purview of the First Amendment.  
Arguing that a right to speech does not imply a right to be heard 
makes about as much sense as arguing that withholding essential 
funding is deeply different from enforcing a penalty.  Each claim 
seems silly in the real world.  The District Court reviewing US v. 
ALA disagreed with the Supreme Court, likening Internet access in 
public libraries to “traditional public fora . . . such as sidewalks and 
parks” because it “promotes First Amendment values in an 
analogous manner.”  In the Library Services and Technology Act, 
Congress encouraged libraries to continue serving “social” as well 
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as “educational” and “informational” purposes.  Yet Rehnquist 
wrote, “The public forum principles on which the District Court 
relied are out of place in the context of this case.  Internet access in 
public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’ public 
forum.”  Incredibly he continued:  “This resource [the Internet] ― 
which did not exist until quite recently ― has not ‘immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.’”  Rehnquist 
concluded that “doctrines surrounding traditional public forums 
may not be extended to situations where such history is lacking.” 
 
11 
 
It seems bizarre and shortsighted to dismiss the Internet as a 
“non-traditional” public forum.  Of course the Internet has no 
lengthy historical tradition ― it’s brand new.  The relevant 
“tradition,” as Congress recognized in the Library Services and 
Technology Act, is the historical function of libraries in society.  In 
other words, libraries are public forums. 
 
 
12 
 
There are two more pertinent traditions which the Court 
overlooks.  It is eminently American to extend the spirit of 
constitutional protection to technologies not anticipated by 
founding fathers.  Declaring that talk since “time out of mind” is 
the only constitutionally protected kind, Rehnquist ironically 
breaks with an American tradition of legal evolution.  We broaden 
the constitutional shield against “unreasonable search and seizure” 
with wiretapping legislation.  We read an unwritten right of 
privacy into the Fourteenth Amendment.  Can we not protect 
speech in cyberspace? 
 
 
13 
 
Federalism, the dispersion of government power to local agencies, 
is a third historical norm undercut by the US v. ALA decision.  
Later I return to the topic of federalism.  Here it may be enough to 
observe that a local library, not the federal government, 
traditionally makes decisions about the contents of local 
collections.  Preemptive government censorship is not an 
American tradition. 
 
 
14 
 
Rehnquist asserts that a lack of “traditions” excuses the US v. ALA 
decision.  To respond, I’ve identified three traditions counter to the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act.  We can take a step further.  We 
can reject altogether the necessity of proving traditions.  Our world 
is a different place since the explosion of electronic technologies in 
the latter half of the twentieth century.  Our libraries are different 
places.  Even if libraries weren’t public forums before the spread of 
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the Internet, they are now.  The Justice Department, for instance, 
invites official public comment online.  Recall the spirited cyber-
discussion of the Microsoft antitrust settlement.  What else can we 
call the Internet but a public forum?  What can we call libraries, 
but essential points of access to this public forum for people 
without alternative avenues for logging on?  Note, too, that online 
commentary about Microsoft was hardly confined to clean 
language.  This sort of government-sanctioned public debate in 
chat rooms and message boards does not make it past the filtering 
software mandated by the Children’s Internet Protection Act. 
 
15 
 
Rehnquist’s argument, at heart, is that the First Amendment is 
irrelevant to libraries because patrons are passive receivers of 
information rather than potential public speakers.  His claim is 
insidiously self-fulfilling.  The broad restrictions to Internet access 
established by CIPA, coupled with the legal reasoning in US v. 
ALA, create a climate where citizens can only express opinions in 
sanctioned terms, about sanctioned subjects. 
 
 
16 
 
Citizens can struggle awfully hard to express themselves freely in 
cyberspace.  Yet the Chief Justice denied that any such struggle 
could exist.  He distinguished US v. ALA from Legal Services 
Corporation v. Velazquez (2001), where the Court ruled that a 
“restriction on advocacy [proposed by Congressional purse-string 
requirements] in welfare disputes would distort the usual 
functioning of the legal profession and the federal and state courts 
before which the lawyers appeared.  . . . Public libraries, by 
contrast, have no comparable role that pits them against the 
Government.”  That is patently false.  Information is power.  It is 
power for self-government and for democratic deliberation.  To 
control information is to control political ideas, speech, perhaps 
even thought.  And information is the stock-in-trade of libraries.  
In Velazquez, the Court concluded that federally funded 
institutions, when their roles pit them against the government, 
“must be free of any conditions that their benefactors might attach 
to the use of donated funds or other assistance.”  Libraries inform 
our free speech just as attorneys inform our legal defenses.  Public 
libraries and public defenders make constitutional rights 
meaningful for the less fortunate. 
 
 
17 
 
Libraries are crucial places where we inform political speech.  In a 
world with the Web, they could also be crucial places where we 
perform political speech.  The institution of the public library has a 
special relationship to the First Amendment, the amendment that 
we give a legally “preferred position” among all our constitutional 
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rights.   We privilege the First Amendment because we know how 
vital free speech and thought are to self-government.  This is 
specific reason why reducing the CIPA case to a spending clause 
dispute is wrong.  Earlier I offered a more general critique of the 
spending clause:  it would be absurd to read the spending clause as 
legalizing total federal control over libraries that are but partially 
federally funded.  In fact, though, the government does assert 
areas of absolute control over institutions that are only partially 
publicly funded.  How can we criticize CIPA while advocating 
affirmative action or Title IX programs that similarly depend on 
the leverage of federal funding for enforcement? 
 
18 
 
Affirmative action and Title IX  programs enable government to 
protect individual rights against powerful (nongovernmental) 
institutions.   Indeed federal prohibitions of discrimination are 
enforced in libraries just as in schools and other workplaces.  But 
the nature of the CIPA funding stipulation is different:  it interferes 
with the capacity of libraries to protect individual rights against 
powerful (governmental) institutions.  The rationale for CIPA is 
that  it protects younger, more innocent library patrons from their 
older, less savory peers.   How do we resolve such a rights-
protection conflict?  The legal answer is that we privilege free 
speech rights with a “preferred position.”  The pragmatic answer is 
that we privilege protections for individuals against institutions.  
Would you rather take on a handful of library patrons or the whole 
government? 
 
 
19 
 
Suppose that you lack the money for lawyers or law classes, but 
you want to learn to challenge the constitutionality of Title IX.  
Where can you go?  The library.  Now suppose you want to learn to 
challenge the constitutionality of library censorship.  Where can 
you go? 
 
 
 
 Technologies for Filtering Free Speech  
 
20 
 
As community forums, public libraries fall squarely within the 
province of the First Amendment.  Advocates of the Children’s 
Internet Protection Act point to “community standards” of 
indecency and obscenity to justify First Amendment restrictions.  
The concerns that motivate the law are real.  The American Library 
Association acknowledges that “patrons of all ages, including 
minors, regularly search for online pornography.  . . . Some 
patrons also expose others to pornographic images by leaving 
them displayed on Internet terminals or printed at library 
printers.”  What can we do to limit access to age-inappropriate 
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materials?  There seem to be three logical possibilities:  regulation 
by man, machine, or a combination. 
 
21 
 
Filtering software required by the Children’s Internet Protection 
Act attempts to solve the porn problem by machine.  The 
technology has several unfortunate limitations.  Computers are 
programmed to block categories such as “pornography” and 
“violence.”  Justice Stevens explains, “search engines that software 
companies use for harvesting are able to search text only, not 
images.  . . . Image recognition technology is immature, ineffective, 
and unlikely to improve substantially in the near future.  . . . 
Because of this ‘underblocking’ [failure to filter pornographic 
images unaccompanied by text] the statute will provide parents 
with a false sense of security without really solving the problem 
that motivated its enactment.”  Filtering software cannot 
completely do the job. 
 
 
22 
 
The larger problem with the software is how it “overblocks” 
information that citizens seek for legitimate research.  When the 
category “violence” is blocked, democratic conversation about 
current events is silenced.  Think of news coverage of the war on 
terror, the war with Iraq, the Balkan and Rwandan genocides.  To 
preemptively censor such primary political information is 
criminal.  Or it was criminal, until the Court upheld CIPA.  As 
recently as 2002, justices ruled in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition that “the Government may not suppress lawful speech as 
the means to suppress unlawful speech.” 
 
 
23 
 
With automated filters, adolescents and adults cannot adequately 
investigate medical illnesses or healthy sexuality.  The software is 
intended to aid youths, yet it hinders help for one of our most at-
risk groups:  young people with questions about sexual 
orientation.  Gay teens have one of the highest rates of suicide in 
our country.  The Internet is serving as a lifeline for a generation of 
adolescents, seeking answers to questions and simply needing to 
know that there are others like them out there.  As these kids grow, 
they keep turning to the Internet ― if we let them.  Help is 
needed:  suicide rates among young adults have tripled since the 
1950s.  As he joined an October 2003 consortium of eighty 
universities with mental health services online, University of 
Arizona President Peter Likins described the utility of anonymous 
Web access.  “Oftentimes, people in depression are not able to go 
to mental health services that are available.  They’re embarrassed,” 
he explained.  “Some of these youngsters may be willing to explore 
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on the Internet and get some anonymous feedback.” 
 
24 
 
Unfiltered, the Internet allows youths as well as their parents a 
safe anonymity to find assistance with a host of taboo social ills ― 
from alcohol and drug addictions, to depression and suicidal 
thoughts, to physical and sexual abuse.  Filtering software puts 
these subjects off-limits, because computers can’t tell a website 
that celebrates snuff films from a support site for survivors of 
domestic violence.  Key words like “rape” and “torture” surface 
both places. 
 
 
25 
 
Despite having worked in library computer labs, I don’t have 
stories to tell about kids using the Internet to get help.  That’s 
precisely the point:  CIPA costs us anonymity.  The story I can tell 
you, however, is about cleaning all the library shelves last spring.  
The section of adolescent help books (on suicide, anorexia, abuse) 
was particularly filthy with fingerprints and food crumbs:  its 
books were much handled.  These shelves were a far cry from our 
pristinely dusty rows of books on modern art and medieval 
history.  Curiously I thumbed through some of the help books.  
Their checkout records, the sheets where we stamp due dates,  
were bare.  If so many hesitate to check out books face-to-face 
from librarians, how many will request Internet filter overrides? 
 
 
26 
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the grave limitations of 
automated filters.  A majority of justices overcame their 
apprehensions by assuming that a combination of human 
intervention with technological innovation could keep kids and 
speech safe.  “If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian will 
unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter 
without significant delay, there is little to this case,” Kennedy 
wrote.  “If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock 
specific Web sites or to disable the filter or if it is shown that an 
adult user’s election to view constitutionally protected Internet 
material is burdened in some other substantial way, that would be 
the subject for an as-applied challenge.”  In other words, Kennedy 
told the American Library Association and the American Civil 
Liberties Union to come back with a more specific complaint.  
Placing this burden of evidence on defenders of the First 
Amendment is inappropriate.  The Supreme Court previously 
outlawed the “prior restraint” of expression, but that is exactly 
what filtering software does. 
 
 
27 
 
The Children’s Internet Protection Act provides no legal definition 
of “bona fide” research.  “We are here to review a statute,” Souter  
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explained, “and the unblocking provisions simply cannot be 
construed, even for constitutional avoidance purposes, to say that 
a library must unblock upon adult request.”  The preemptive use of 
filters turns librarians into gatekeepers.  No librarian I know wants 
this job.  Nor would many citizens want to give such responsibility 
to librarians. 
 
28 
 
Yes, we live in a country where handfuls of librarians ― although 
not the ones I know ― keep banning books like Harry Potter for 
references to the occult or Huckleberry Finn for use of the term 
“nigger.”  Twain’s masterpiece is available on the Internet because 
its copyright has expired.  But if you look it up in a public library 
that searches Web text for the “n” word, you won’t be able to read 
the American classic online.  That word also figures in the hate 
speech that filters target.  Why should this matter, as long as we 
have hard copies of Huck?  One answer is that electronic texts 
allow unique opportunities to analyze arguments, automating 
word searches to measure patterns in language.  The biggest 
problem with filters, though, is that requiring citizens to seek case-
by-case permission to access online content has an extraordinarily 
chilling effect.  It is precisely the people who need help most ― the 
poor, abused, or socially isolated ― who are least likely to 
anticipate (or, perhaps, to receive) sympathetic assistance from 
librarians. 
 
 
29 
 
Rehnquist replies that “close monitoring of computer users [by 
library staff] would be far more intrusive than the use of filtering 
software.”  Point taken.  Here, though, the Chief Justice suffers a 
simple lack of imagination.  Librarians looking over the shoulders 
of everyone is not the only alternative to automated censorship by 
computer.  There are other ways to organize library supervision by 
man more than machine.  It is not hard to separate a supervised 
area for children’s computers from an unsupervised set of 
terminals for adults.  Many libraries do this already.  Another 
practice common among libraries is to institute time limits for 
computer use during busy periods of the day, stifling surfers who 
might otherwise troll endlessly for porn. 
 
 
30 
 
Low-tech alternatives to CIPA are superior for reasons beyond the 
Constitution.  The possibility of inappropriate use of the Internet 
by youths is an argument for adult supervision, not an excuse to 
shift responsibility for our kids onto inadequate software.  Kids in 
libraries need supervision anyway:  they shout, vandalize, and 
occasionally wreak broader havoc.  Filtering software can’t save the 
money for staffing this sort of supervision.  And if, as Rehnquist 
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suggests, librarians are eminently accessible to flip filtering 
software on and off, what does filtering software save in staff 
hours?  “The District Court expressly found that a variety of 
alternatives less restrictive are available at the local level,” Stevens 
noted dryly. 
 
 
 
Always Choose the Lesser of Two Evils: 
A Federalist Principle for 
Protecting Free Speech 
 
 
31 
 
Mine is a political argument about how and why we protect our 
freedoms.  It is not a close legal analysis of the CIPA decision.  
Here I quote more often from dissenting than plurality views, and 
I do not aim for a more meticulous scholarship.  Instead I write as 
a fan of the First Amendment who distrusts the “prior restraints,” 
the “time, place, and manner restrictions,” and even the 
“community standards” that the Supreme Court allows for 
censoring indecent and obscene material.  No more do I want local 
control over free speech than I want national control of it. 
 
 
32 
 
From living in both, I appreciate that there can be a world of 
difference between the small-town Midwest and the big-city East.  
I recognize that cultural definitions of art and decency vary, and I 
know that some communities would install filtering software in 
their libraries with or without the Children’s Internet Protection 
Act.  Before legislation mandated the software, almost seventeen 
percent of public libraries used filters on at least some of their 
Internet terminals.  Seven percent had filters on all of them.  But if 
libraries are going to use filtering software, where should the 
directive arise?  The legal doctrine of “community standards” 
emphasizes that First Amendment restrictions should be 
formulated by local authorities.  If the decision to filter the 
Internet is left to individual communities, we can cross our fingers 
that not all will choose censorship.  “Rather than allowing local 
decision makers to tailor their responses to local problems,” 
Stevens lamented, “the Children’s Internet Protection Act operates 
as a blunt nationwide restraint on adult access to ‘an enormous 
amount of valuable information’ that individual librarians cannot 
possibly review.  . . . Most of that information is constitutionally 
protected speech.” 
 
 
33 
 
Although my libertarian propensity is to label local control “the 
lesser of two evils,” I find cause for optimism in fellow librarians.  
After September 11, Congress adopted the USA PATRIOT Act  
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(2001).  It empowers federal law enforcers to seek search warrants 
for library records.  The Bush Administration touted the law’s 
potential to identify and incriminate terrorists.  The mere act of 
reading books on bombs, biotechnology, or mental illness can be 
used against defendants.  In response, many librarians have 
retooled their catalog systems to reduce the information kept on 
patrons.  The government can’t get what librarians don’t have.  No 
doubt there are librarians somewhere keeping records as detailed 
as ever, despite the consequences for the civil rights of their 
patrons.  When First Amendment decisions (good or bad) are 
made at a local level, at least there is recourse to the “strict 
scrutiny” of content-based restrictions by higher courts.  But if the 
Supreme Court writes Congress a blank check to require universal 
content restrictions, as it has done in US v. ALA, where is the 
recourse?  What happens to our system of checks and balances?  
This is where freedom of speech is supposed to serve us most 
vitally, as an essential political tool.  But this is where freedom of 
speech is getting stomped by the Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
Selecting Books and Censoring Speech: 
Two Sides of a Coin?  
 
34 
 
The most compelling arguments for the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act are flawed analogies.  Rehnquist asserted that 
“strict scrutiny” of Congressional censorship of libraries is not 
warranted because “such a limiting and rigid test would 
unreasonably interfere with the discretion inherent in the 
‘selection’ of a library’s collection.”  Generally the District Court 
conceded, “the First Amendment subjects libraries’ content-based 
decisions about which print materials to acquire for their 
collections to only rational [basis] review.”  The standard of 
rational review requires the government merely to show that a 
speech restriction furthers a “compelling state interest.”  Here the 
compelling concern is child protection.  “Most libraries already 
exclude pornography from their print collections because they 
deem it inappropriate for inclusion,” Rehnquist elaborated.  “We 
do not subject these decisions to heightened scrutiny; it would 
make little sense to treat libraries’ judgments to block online 
pornography any differently, when these judgments are made for 
just the same reason.”  (The point Rehnquist misses, even in his 
own words, is that these are decisions libraries make, not the 
federal government.) 
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35 
 
Libraries are allowed to be selective because resources are limited, 
not because censorship is otherwise acceptable.  The Internet, 
therefore, is a whole different game from books.  “In the instance 
of the Internet, what the library acquires is electronic access, and 
the choice to block is a choice to limit access that has already been 
acquired.   Thus deciding against buying a book means there is no 
book (unless a loan can be obtained), but blocking the Internet is 
merely blocking access purchased in its entirety and subject to 
unblocking if the librarian agrees.   The proper analogy,” Souter 
dissented, “is not to passing up a book that might have been 
bought; it is either to buying a book and then keeping it from 
adults lacking an acceptable ‘purpose,’ or to buying an 
encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought to 
be unsuitable for all adults.” 
 
 
36 
 
Waffling, Breyer sympathized with Souter but voted with Scalia.  
He drew a second flawed analogy, comparing the use of electronic 
filters with the segregation of print materials in closed stacks.  Yet 
the American Library Association came out against “locked 
shelves” in 1973.  It reasoned that, although “the limitation [of 
closed stacks] differs from direct censorship activities, such as 
removal of library materials or refusal to purchase certain 
publications, it nonetheless constitutes censorship, albeit a subtle 
form.”  In cyberspace, censoring speech and selecting texts need 
not be two sides of a single coin.  Each is a separate currency, 
censorship costing far more than selection.  “The difference 
between choices to keep out and choices to throw out,” Souter 
concluded, is “enormous.” 
 
 
 
 
The Second-Best Thing about the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act  
 
37 
 
The best thing about the Children’s Internet Protection Act is its 
intention:  to keep kids safe.  The second-best thing is that only 
four of nine justices could agree on a reason to uphold the law.  
When less than a majority of the Supreme Court concurs in the 
legal reasoning of an opinion, the result is a “plurality.”  A plurality 
decision does not make binding legal precedent.  If it chooses, the 
Court can more quickly reverse its interpretation of the law.  Keep 
your fingers crossed. 
 
 
38 
 
It feels appropriate ― ironic and subversive ― that I researched 
this article exclusively on the Internet.  Sadly I could not do this 
work at a public library.  Articles about filtering software often  
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mention taboo terms like “pornography,” which trigger filtering 
software to block access to the information.  Even the text of the 
CIPA decision, written by the justices themselves, might be 
blocked by filters.  And since I typed into this piece the word 
“pornography” (just did it again!), chances are that you are not 
reading this article in a public library.  US v. ALA should not 
stand.  Let us call on the Court to protect us from the Children’s 
Internet Protection Act. 
 
 
 
 
© Anna Lorien Nelson, 2004.  
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